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REPLY ARGUMENT
The issues I raised on appeal involve laws and procedures that
are wholly repugnant to the institution of marriage. These obvious
flaws have gone unchallenged for so long because the Courts'
procedures completely disrupt marriages that could be preserved in
the judicial system.
Many articles and publications by the Bar and Bench are
concerned with the lack of respect lawyers receive compared to other
professions, particularly doctors.

It is of some value to compare

divorce law to the medical field to uncover the real problems.

It

is hard to imagine a dentist being instructed to heal a cavity like
a flesh wound "except as provided in this chapter" especially if he
ignores all the exceptions and treats it like a wound. [See Utah
Code 30-3-1(1)].

He wouldn't save any teeth and would likely do

more damage than if he had done nothing.
Divorce and marriage problems have very little to do with
neighbors

who

are disputing

a

fence

line.

Litigation

and'

accusatory proceedings may work in resolving fence lines, because
the parties are not united for life, but trials cannot solve
marriage problems.

This is the reason the trial judge decrees
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divorce nearly 100% of the time instead of sometimes dismissing the
complaint.
If a doctor uses an operating procedure that ends in failure
and the patient's death 100% of the time, the public would be irate
if he didn't cease that procedure.

Why should the public admire a

justice system that never heals marriages, as directed by the
legislature, and causes more disruption of the relationship and
high costs in the process?

And children end up as the real silent

victims who pay the rest of their lives.
The Salt Lake Tribune's front page reported recently (June 3,
1997) in an article entitled "For Children, Time May Not Heal the
Wounds of Divorce":
"The child's suffering does not reach its
peak at the time of breakoff and then level
off," she says (Judith Wallerstein) "On the
contrary, divorce is a cumulative experience
for the child.
Its impact increases over
time". (Emphasis added).
Counsel points out (C.4), the strained relationships of me and
the children, but the trial court has simply sought to sever
entirely those relationships instead of correcting how others have
interfered.

Page 62 of "The Abolition of Marriage" (See Addendum)

says:
"But when the father moves out of the
home, the paternal relationship deteriorates
rapidly...More than half of the children whose
fathers don't live with them say they don't
get all of the affection they need from their
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fathers.
Again, those who saw their absent
fathers frequently did not evaluate their
relationships more favorably than those who
saw them infrequently."
(Page 60)
"To a considerable and unrecognized extent,
the father's role is sustained through and by
women. When women (many for very understandable reasons) refuse to take on this burden,
the child suffers the loss as well."
(Page 61)
"Here is the puzzle the current research
poses: Although
inside of marriage
the
presence of an active father makes a great
difference in the children's well being, the
presence of that same father outside of
marriage, seems not to have the same benefits
for children.
The father's role is particularly fragile
and vulnerable to disruption outside of the
marriage."
For some reason counsel says my memorandum to the trial court was
"untimely" (C.5), while admitting that it was delivered to the court
before trial on September 6, 1996 and after August 22, 1996 (The
date of the Court's minute entry and denial).

It could not have

been more timely.
The "Statement of Facts" of counsel's brief needs several
corrections. (C.6-C.7) It says that there have been "real problems"
but ignores the efforts that have led to real solutions.
Marriage vows are made to commit a couple to surmount problems.
The marriage covenant is not dependant on a lack of "problems and
difficulties," for they come to every marriage.

For example,

counsel says that our problems started when I lost my job.
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He then

complains in the next paragraph that for a couple of months I
failed to support my family, but ignores that the direct result of
my willingness to look for a new job (R.4 07) during those months,
that I got a new supervisor and position that has led to a couple
of promotions and several raises. (R.445).
job in search of better employment

If I had not left my

I would have continued the

problem of the same position and low pay.

But I returned to a new

position that has allowed me to double my income in only two years
and receive

full benefits for medical, dental, retirement

vacation, etc. which we lacked before.

and

Leaving the family for that

time was not the problem or grounds for divorce, but rather the
solution to the problem (R. 359,407,472) .
Several times in error, counsel says (C.6,7) that I separated
myself from the family.

It is well established in the record

(R.356,357) that my wife and I have not lived together since she
took the children and left.

She admitted that she stayed in 3

different homes, she kept the children from me and she was "afraid
to come home" before I left.

She refused to return home until I

left, I didn't want to leave (R.493) and the marriage counselor
asked me (R.358) to do it so he could work with Piper. (R.393,381,
472,473)
Counsel errors again by saying that the family was "without
financial resources or support" during that time, when, in fact,
the home was paid for so there was no mortgage payment, there was
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plenty of food and I paid the bills ahead (R.437,438).

Counsel

wrongly says there was no money when, in fact, Piper had $1,000.00
in her own insurance investments that she didn't use until months
after filing for divorce (R.311).
Counsel says (C.7) the Trial Court granted the divorce on the
grounds of a long list of faults that he lists, when, in fact, the
Trial Court said simply that divorce was granted on my wife's
testimony that "the differences are irreconcilable" (R.505).

The

Court did not mention: "controlling, critical of her and the
children, very domineering, preaching to her which made her feel
degraded and unworthy," much less say they were grounds as counsel
asserts.

In the same paragraph counsel infers my agreement with my

wife's conclusions, when my testimony clearly shows those listed
faults belong to the people who told Piper to get a divorce (R.159,
162,163,168,459).
Counsel then claims I blame "unnamed others" who, in fact, are
named by himself on page 458 of the record.

I simply followed the

advice of the Utah Supreme Court to avoid printing more than is
necessary that could embarrass others in public records. (Cawley v.
Cawley

202 P.

10,11):

"If we undertook to state the evidence we
would be compelled to publish many things that
would be of no benefit to either bench or bar
and could subserve no good purpose whatever.
To publish the evidence in this case and make
it a permanent record in our official reports
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could only result in doing an unnecessary
thing and one which, in after years, might
easily become a constant source of regret to
both
parties
and
their
friends,
while
benefiting no one."
Last of all (C.7) counsel has the nerve to pursue a claim that
I refused to go to marriage counseling.

His claim amounts to no

more than his scheme of telling my wife to call me a couple of days
before trial and offer to attend conciliation if I gave up my
interest in our home at trial (R.408,409) . When the truth began to
come to light at trial, counsel attempted to cover it up by saying
(R.372) "Objection.

It's in the course of trying to compromise and

settle the case, and it's not admissible."

It is not true to say

I refused to attend marriage counseling.
ISSUE "A"
With grounds in dispute/ did the Trial Court err by placing my
wife and I in adversarial roles?
and
With grounds in dispute, did the Trial Court err by failing to
provide opportunity through the Court to reconcile before trial by,
but not limited to, conciliation?
Contrary to counsel's brief (C.9), Utah Code 30-3-17 is not
dependant on "assuming the District Court had established a Family
Court."

It is entirely apart from the "Family Court".

Its own

language begins, "The judge of a District Court may counsel either
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spouse or both...." and then gives him the option of sending this
couple before "a domestic relations counselor" if available or many
other persons as he sees fit.
relation

counselors"

(C.8,9)

The fact there are no "domestic
only

narrows

the

District

Court

judge's options by one.
This issue applies instead to Utah Code 30-3-12 that says,
"Each District Court.... shall exercise the family counseling powers
conferred by this act."

(Emphasis added)

Those powers are found

in Utah Code 30-3-17 and other places. Clearly "shall" is not
discretionary for A. E. v.
2, 1997)

Christean

316 Utah Adv.

Rep.

3, 5 (May

says it could only be discretionary if it were not "for

the benefit of the parent and/or child."
The legislature demands that the courts do something to try to
preserve

all

families.

This

follows

the

logic

that

if

the

legislature expresses the State's interest in retaining power over
marriage to preserve it, that the courts must reflect that interest
by making reconciliation efforts when we come before the court.

If

the

of

legislature

wanted

to be

"divorce

Dispensers" instead

marriage preservers, they could just have us pay an extra ten
dollars for divorce at the same time we register our automobiles,
but their compelling interest is to save families!
the recent decision in A. E.

v.

Appeals says on Page 6:
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Christean,

Quoting again

The Utah Court of

. . . ."Strive to act in the best interest of the
minor's in all cases and attempt to preserve
and strengthen family ties where possible."....
"Every reasonable effort should be made to
preserve the family unit." (Emphasis added)
The

statutes

that

are

quoted

in

both

briefs

unmistakable legislative intent to preserve marriage.
by saying

show

this

Counsel errs

(C.1,2) that the standard of review is an abuse of

discretion standard. The legal issue is more properly under a
correction of error standard.
year, Zoll

& Branch,

P.C.

The Utah Supreme Court ruled this

v. Asay

932 P. 2d 592

(Utah

1997)

on

page

593:
"The interpretation of statutes poses a
question of law, which this Court reviews for
correctness and without deference to the lower
court's conclusions ..."
"This Court has not previously had
occasion to interpret Section 30-28-5(1) of
the act. We therefore "note the directive that
we construe statutes liberally with a view to
effect [ing] their objects and to promot[ing]
justice.
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-2.
Upon a
question of first impression such as this, it
is our duty to accord that section effect."
(Emphasis added)
Repeatedly, before trial, The District Court grossly exceeds
the

power

and

jurisdiction

accorded

by

the

legislature

and

continually fails its responsibilities and obligations demanded by
law.
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Anonymous

1986) page

Wife

v.

Anonymous

Husband

739 P. 2d 791

(Ariz.App.

793 clearly explains;
"This country did not inherit either a
common law or a statutory law of divorce,
because divorce was in the realm of the
English ecclesiastical courts until the 19th
century and canon law was controlling..."
"Since our courts were without
inherent
legal or equitable powers relating to divorce,
the guiding principle is that every power
exercised by a court in a divorce proceeding
must find its source in the relevant statutory
framework, "or it does not exist" • . . .
"It follows that in a divorce proceeding
the trial court can consider only strictly
germane matters." (Emphasis added)

Even the Utah Court of Appeals explains in Haumont v. Haumont
793 P. 2d 421,427

(Utah App.

1990):

"Where a form of conduct referred to in a
statute designates the persons and things to
which it refers, "there is an inference that
all omissions should be understood as
exclusions." (Emphasis added)
Here are a few examples of the District Court's errors. After
receiving the complaint for divorce and the reply, why did the
District Court not try to effect reconciliation?

(Utah Code 3 0-3-

11.1, 30-3-12, 30-3-16.1-16.7, 30-3-17) Why did the District Court
not talk with us and explain the State's compelling interest in
resolving our disputes and saving the marriage?

Instead, the

District Court allowed and encouraged claims and counterclaims and
then issues an Order on Order to Show Cause (R.71-77) on a long
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list of items. The legislature did not encourage or authorize all
this governmental and legal intrusion and activity over all these
issues.

It only allows for alimony, child support [Utah Code 30-3-

3(3)], custody [30-3-10(1)], visitation [30-3-34(1)] and "interim
orders as may be just and equitable" [30-3-18(1)].

Why does the

District Court make me surrender all property rights or fight my
wife for it?

It certainly wasn't the legislature's intention.

Why

am I restrained from seeing my wife and using any of our property?
The District Court should not have considered all these issues, but
it had the duty to be equitable anyway.

How do I reconcile with my

wife when ordered to stay away until trial?
should have reunited us instead.

The District Court

The law tells the judge to give

orders to save the marriage and to "compel" "other persons" (Utah
Code

30-3-16.1,

30-3-17).

"Other

persons"

should

have

been

restrained, not me.
I sought reconciliation, but the District Court threatened me
if I didn't start fighting against my wife for divorce.

On March

28, 1996, the District Court sent me a letter that says in part
(R.105):
"Failure to file the financial declaration
and proposed settlement forms may result in
the pre-trial settlement conference being
continued, attorney fees assessed and other
sanctions imposed against one or both parties."
The District Court further threatens (R.115):
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"FAILURE BY EITHER PARTY TO COMPLETE,
PRESENT AND FILE THIS FORM AS REQUIRED WILL
AUTHORIZE THE COURT TO ACCEPT THE STATEMENT OF
THE OTHER PARTY AS THE BASIS FOR ITS DECISION".
Nowhere

in Title

30, does

the

legislature

authorize

the

District Court to show such defiance and contempt for our property
and

privacy

rights.

The

Statutes

repeatedly

use

the

word

"equitable", which means fair. That is the District Court's duty.
It is no wonder that clear, blatant acts and threats like this
cause the parties to give up on the marriage and children and to
begin fighting for the best situation in divorce.
ISSUE "B"
Did the Trial Court err in granting divorce without showing
the irreparable breakdown of the marriage?
Counsel says this issue should be reviewed under the "clearly
erroneous standard" (C.2,C10).

He is wrong, as the Trial Court

has no discretion to decree divorce. Correction of error standard
is required in this Question of law. (See page 8 of reply brief,
Zoll

and

Branch)

Utah Code 30-3-4(1) (b) and

(d)(P.2)

requires

that

haven't

divorce decrees to be based on the evidence.
Counsel

further

errs

(C.12)

by

saying

I

marshalled the evidence, while he tries to introduce as "evidence"
what the trial judge excluded.

It is a a fact that the trial judge

said before trial that Piper could have a divorce if she wanted
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it. (R.166) That "conclusion of law" the trial judge affirmed in the
ruling by saying (R.505):
"She is not willing to enter into marriage
counseling at this point and not willing to
remain married at this point.
The plaintiff,
I believe, also based upon her testimony, has
concluded that she does not wish to have a
reconciliation." (Emphasis added)
The trial judge then proceeded to say that the divorce decree
is being based upon the wife's conclusions, in spite of the law
that

demands divorce to based on the evidence.

Counsel says

himself(C.12) :
"The Court found that the plaintiff had
concluded that their differences are so great
that no reasonable effort would reconcile
them." (Emphasis added)
The Court never found "irreconcilable differences".
Counsel tries to present as "evidence" what the trial judge did
not sanction.

For example, he says that I disapproved of Piper

working out of the home.

At trial he tried to get her to say that

I disapproved before she filed for divorce (R.301),but she couldn't
because it is a subject we have never discussed, so he claimed a
letter written January 19, 1996 says this (R.469), but the judge
excluded

such evidence in the ruling by saying

(R.504): "that

testimony was limited to the past year and preceding the filing of
the complaint."
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Everyone must remember that the record shows that the trial
judge permitted a continuing objection on all the testimony the
Court was allowing (R.2 98).
desire

for

accusations

a

Although the legislature's expressed

"no-fault" ground

was

to

prevent

inflammatory

at trial, the trial judge, instead, allowed all

testimony on any fault, weakness, mistake or event in my life in a
"witch-hunt" for grounds (R.297,298). Now counsel endeavors to use
a full page (C.ll) of immaterial, moot or negated past events as
proof of "irreconcilable differences", but the trial judge said
"past year" (R.504) not "during the marriage (C.ll)."
Proper

evidence

must

support

the

true

"irreconcilable differences of the marriage"
1(3)(h)].

meaning

of

[Utah Code 30-3-

According to the dictionary it means: differences that

are impossible to reconcile. For example, my car mechanic may find
my car difficult to fix and may not want to fix it. He may list a
lot of problems and we may even disagree, but none of this means
that the car is impossible to fix.
The Utah Supreme Court (Zoll
592,594)

v. Branch,

P.C.

v. Asay

says:

".... Statutes are generally to be
construed according to their plain language.
When language is clear and unambiguous,
it must be held to mean what it expresses and
no room is left for construction."
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932

P2.d

Counsel gives no admissible, authentic, corroborated evidence
at all of differences or why they are impossible to reconcile. For
authority he uses Grosskopf

v.

Grosskopf

672 P. 2d 814

(Wyl984),

but

look at the substantial differences that the Court found as facts
and evidence in that case (Page 818):
". . .. Insistent that the parties move....
wanted
appellee
to
quit
his
job
. . . .dissatisfied with the home and wanted to
sell it....decided to practice celibacy during
the last two years ...."etc, etc.
And most of all the Court found (P.817):
The evidence established, and the parties
generally agreed that the differences existing
between them were such that there was no
prospect for reconciling." (Emphasis added)
If this Appellate Court feels that the language of the statute
is unclear and subject to arbitrary, inconsistent enforcement, then
the decisions of many States show a proper understanding of "nofault" divorce in 55 ALR 3d 581 (R. 173-209, see addendum) as argued
in the appellant's brief (P.20-29) , as does 24 AmJur 2d § 31 that
lists many cases that show "irreconcilable differences" refering to
"substantial" impairment of the marital relationship, that "mere
unhappiness" or "parties" cannot decide if grounds exist and that
the

court

must

find, not

"perfunctorily",

differences with

no

"possibility of elimination, correction or resolution."
I correctly marshall this evidence.

Almost all the trial

judge says to base the ruling is quoted in my brief (P.20,21) and
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then I quote from the record substantially all the evidence used by
the

judge

(P.22) .

I then demonstrate

that not only are

the

"findings legally insufficient" (C.10,12), but are completely nonexistent within the meaning of the law.

The District Court cannot

say, "I find grounds because the wife concludes that there are
irreconcilable differences."
ISSUE "C"
Is Utah Code 30-3-1(3)(h) "irreconcilable differences of the
marriage" unconstitutional?
This

issue is properly before the Appellate Court, being

timely raised to the Trial Court and in the pleadings. [In James
Preston
says:

746 P.2d

799,

801

(Utah

App.

1987)

v.

the Court of Appeals

"A matter is sufficiently raised if it has been submitted to

the Trial Court and the Trial Court has had the opportunity to make
findings of fact or law."]
My exact words to the Court were (R.166) :
"55 ALR 3d 581 is probably the best source
to show how a "no-fault" divorce can be
appealed from numerous diverse legal aspects
if not shown to be a marriage that "had
irreparably broken down." A divorce cannot be
decreed without "substantial reasons". ...
"After all, the original Utah Constitution
down to this day says in Article I, Sec. 7
[due process of law] No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law".
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The

above

ALR

annotation,

with

its

discussion

on

constitutionality, was given in its entirety to the trial judge and
is included in the record(R.173-209). After a lengthy discussion
and debate in trial about the meaning and use of this no-fault law,
the trial judge allowed a continuing objection (R.2 98) to avoid a
long

stream

of

objections.

I

believe

the

question

of

constitutionality is a part of that objection, as much so as is the
irrelevant and immaterial evidence received by the Trial Court.
(Some

things

discussed

happened

near

the

beginning

of

the

marriage).
Furthermore, the trial judge refused repeatedly to allow time
for us to present all our evidence (P.34)(R.476).

The effort was

made, in vain, many times at trial to have the judge consider this
authority (R.288,490,492,500). Counsel quotes this ALR authority
(R.175).

He says of irreconcilable differences (C.13):
"....and unconstitutional vagueness of
statutory language, but no dissolution of
marriage act of the type here under
consideration has been held invalid as of this
writing."

•Counsel says, (C.13) "statutes providing for dissolution of
marriage on grounds of irreconcilable differences, have been held
to be valid".

And repeats the same sentence almost verbatim on

page 15 of his brief.
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But the question here is not whether any "no-fault" statute is
constitutional,

the

question

is;

Is

Utah

Code

30-3-1(3) (h)

"irreconcilable differences of the marriage" unconstitutional?
No doubt other States have succeeded drafting valid laws, but
Utah's legislature did not do its job completely to make Utah's law
sound.
It is not lightly that the validity of this law is being
raised.

This question is as serious as any issue in this brief,

maybe more so.
The

Utah

Supreme

Court

says

(Rio

Grande

v. Darke

167

P.241,242):

"The citizens of a free government are
justly jealous of their constitutional rights
and privileges, and this should be attributed
to them as a virtue rather than a fault. It
keeps them on the alert and inspires them with
courage and determination in their efforts to
resist the aggressions of arbitrary power. It
is just as obligatory upon the citizen to
resist encroachments upon his rights and
liberties guaranteed by the Constitution as it
is for him to uphold and maintain its
integrity." (Emphasis added)
And further (Garfield
Utah

178 P.

Smelting

Co. V. Industrial

Commission

57,62):

"If there is one fundamental principle
which is calculated to perpetuate our form of
government, both federal and state, more than
any other it is that every citizen, regardless
of his station or condition, is entitled to
the equal protection of the law whether it

17

of

applies to his personal or to his property
rights. Every law which offends against that
principle in the federal Constitution is
necessarily invalid".
Herein on page 16 is counsel's quote which includes the words
"unconstitutional vagueness of the statutory language."
The Utah Supreme Court explains vagueness in State
733 P.2d

502,

505

(Utah

v.

Hoffman

1987):

"'Vagueness' goes
to
the
issue of
procedural due process, i.e., whether the
statute is sufficiently explicit and clear to
inform
the
ordinary
reader
of
common
intelligence what conduct is prohibited."
(Emphasis added)
Piper and I got married in 1978 when "fault grounds" told us
what behavior, in clear language, could end our marriage.

In 1987

the legislature added a no-fault ground with no explanation as to
its meaning or use.

(It was like putting a baby elephant into a

henhouse with no special accommodation for its different nature).
Now what did the statute tell me to do to prevent divorce?

It

was not explicit and clear to me or to anyone else in the court
room.

The trial judge repeatedly advocated that it means that

anyone

who asks

for

a divorce and doesn't want to work on

the

marriage can have one (R.166,504,505) . This means that marriage is
not a vow or lifetime commitment, but merely the same thing as what
used to be its polar opposite.
"shacking up."

To the trial judge marriage is

However those who just "live together" can split up
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and make every decision to divide and pay everything without going
to the courthouse. This is a denial of equal protection which will
be discussed later.
"Irreconcilable differences" was argued in another extreme by
counsel.

At trial, counsel maintained that this statute was just

another fault ground which allowed any and all faults to be
presented.

No longer was evidence or testimony limited to a

specific area;

anything was allowed now. Counsel said (R. 2 97) :

Utah is still a fault State and
irreconcilable differences is one of the
grounds set forth in the statute as the basis
for divorce, and that is fault."
(Emphasis
added)
The Utah Supreme Court gives a three-step test for vagueness
that this statute fails entirely.
Packard

250 P. 2d 561,564)

The Court then says: (State v.

"However, whichever way it was meant,

uncertainties would exist which make the statute void."

(Emphasis

added)
Having studied the issue in depth, my argument of its meaning
differed greatly from the Trial Court and counsel and revolved
around the oft-mentioned 55 ALR 3d 581.
Furthermore, this legal authority that I provided to support
this claim also speaks about being "overbroad" (R.181) on the pages
that I named (P. 29) for the benefit of this Court.

Because the

trial judge based the ruling and divorce decree on: (R.504) "He
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preaches

to

her" and

"she's

disagreed"

and

"the parties

have

disagreed," then this statute is also fatally overbroad for it
forbids

us

our

(Constitution

of

fundamental
Utah,

right

Article

I,

to

freedom

Section

I;

of

United

speech.
States

Constitution, Amendment I) The dictionary says of "preach": to urge
acceptance

or abandonment of an idea or course of action, to

advocate

earnestly; and says to "disagree" means to differ

in

opinion.

It makes no sense to dissolve a marriage simply because

someone exercised their constitutional right to communicate their
opinions.

To refuse a spouse this right of freedom of speech would

mean having to "agree" to everything and anything one's mate says
or does.

That sounds like slavery, not marriage.

The Utah Supreme Court

(In re Boyer

636

P. 2d

1085,

1090)

quotes the United States Supreme Court as follows:
"A clear and precise enactment may
nevertheless be 'overbroad' if in its reach it
prohibits constitutionally protected conduct."
It is plain error for the trial judge to decree divorce based
on "preaching" and "disagreeing" for those fall under our fundamental
S^ght of freedom of speech.

Also the judgment must fail because it

was plain error for the trial judge to deprive me of virtually all
our property and my relationships with our children.
In State

v.

Dunn 850 P.2d

1201,

1208

(Utah

1993), the Utah

Supreme Court explains the three requirements to obtain appellate
relief from error even if it were "not properly objected to." These
20

are similar to those enumerated by the United States Supreme Court
in May of this year
(1997)].

1066

[Johnson

Moreover, J". I.

(Kan.

App.

1986)

Case

v.
Credit

U.

S.

117

Corp.

v.

S.Ct.
Foos

1544,

1546,

717 P.2d

1064,

provides unlimited appellate review on

conclusions of law on unraised issues when plain error is evident
or fundamental rights are at issue. [See also Falk
782 P.2d

974,

982

(Wash.

v. Keene

Corp.

1989)].

Instead of following the law and preserving our family as
desired by the legislature, the trial judge was very anxious to use
power and authority in all other areas of our lives.

In the

process, the judge awarded to me the use of less than 2% of our
entire estate, awarded my wife alimony although she had no house
payment, gave me nearly all the marital debt to pay and restrained
the children from going with me or staying with me.

This is

obvious and plain error that impedes my constitutional right to our
property and to be with our children. "Irreconcilable differences"
evaporated my most cherished rights when I joined a small class of
citizens who dared to seek to oppose the dissolution of marriage
(R.180).

It permitted procedures that allowed the government to

intrude in areas with no reason to be there.
On May 1, 1996, a minute entry to the District Court says;
"Commissioner recommends: set for trial on the following issues,"
followed by a list of nine items (R.104) .

No where in Title 30

does the legislature tell the judge to make orders about our life
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insurance, or retirement or our property, but it seems after so
many years of unchallenged power, that the judiciary began to
exceed its authority.

Missing from the list is grounds!

The

commissioner told us, in effect, that "irreconcilable differences"
meant the marriage was over when my wife asked for a divorce
(R.165).
Utah Code 3 0-3-5(1) says:
"When a decree of divorce is rendered, the
court may include in it equitable orders
relating to the children, property, debts or
obligations, and parties." (Emphasis added)
It is plain error for the Court to order me to receive 1% of
our property for the next decade.

It had no authority to impair

this constitutional right and any order it made should have made
sure we each immediately received 50% of the property. The judgment
also fails for depriving me of the right of maintaining parental
ties with our children. [A. E.
(May 1,

1997) , In re J.P.

Utah,

v. Christean
648 P.2d

316 Utah Adv.
1364,

The Utah Supreme Court says in Bountiful
P. 194,199

Rep

3,4

1372-1374]

City

v. De Luca 292

that the police powers of the State cannot "Infringe or

invade" constitutional rights and on page 2 01 that our "right to
^property" is protected from "impairment or abridgement."
every page of Block

v. Schwartz

Nearly

76 P. 22 has directives by the Utah

Supreme Court warning against the State using its police power to
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overstep rights to a "class" or individual which are accorded to
"other persons".
It is plain error for the judge to say before trial that my
wife can have a divorce if she wants it(R.166).

"Irreconcilable

difference" caused the trial judge to deny a fair trial and to
improperly receive evidence of fault.

The United States Supreme

Court says [Bracy

1793,

v.

Gramley

1175 S.Ct.

1797,

(1997)]:

"But the floor established by the Due
Process Clause clearly requires a 'fair trial
in a fair tribunal, ... ' before a judge with
no actual bias against the defendant or
interest in the outcome of his particular
case." (Emphasis added)
The validity of the statute is further eroded by the United
States Supreme Court in Gilbert

v. Homar

117

S.Ct.

1807,

1812

(1997) when it explains a part of due process includes "the risk of
erroneous deprivation of such

[private] interest through the

procedures used."
The judgment perishes from failure to follow the Utah Supreme
Court's direction concerning fundamental rights (H-L-v.
604 P. 2d 907,

Matheson

909):

"Legislative enactments must be narrowly
drawn to express only the legitimate State
interests at stake."
See also Rupp v. Grantsville

City

610 P. 2d 338,341

[6] .

Finally, 16A AmJur 2d § 771 explains the United States Supreme
Court ruling (Eisenstadt

v. Baird)
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of a State statute :

"Providing
dissimilar
treatment
for
married
and
unmarried
persons
who
are
similarly situated, the statute violates the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
Utah

Code 30-3-1(3) (h) is unconstitutional

as vague

and

overbroad which confusion was the cause of a judgment that denied
due process, equal protection and allowed government intrusion into
fundamental rights.

It is the root cause of much plain error that

should nullify the judgment and decree.

The law cannot burden us

and deprive us rights that all other people enjoy.
The Trial Court did not properly find grounds within the
meaning of the law

(no evidence was offered) and denied us due

process of law that provides for marriage preservation, all of
which should void the decree.
I respectfully ask the Appellate Court to reverse our divorce
decree and remand to the District Court this case for dismissal.
Dated the 14th day of July, 1997.

3?

<#&&

Dan Rodney Joos, Pro Se
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E. H. Fankhauser, Esq.
243 East 400 South, Suite # 200
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Dan Rodney
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